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United States v. Quinones
205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

United States v. Fell
217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002)
LFacts
The United States Government intended to seekthe death penaltyunder the
Federal Death Penalty Act' ("FDPA7) in prosecutions against Alan Quinones
("Quinones") and Donald Fell ("Fell") in the United States District Courts for
the Southern District of New York and the District of Vermont, respctively. 2
Before either trial began, both Quinones and Fell made motions to declare the
FDPA unconstitutionaL3 After its review of the parties' written submissions and
oral arguments, the Q imw court declared its tentative decision to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the death penalty aspects of the case, but requested
further briefs by both parties in support of their arguments.4 Fell first filed a
motion with the United States District Court for the District of Vermont seeking
a declaration that the FDPA isunconstitutional for numerous reasons, and then
filed a supplemental motion in which he argued that Ring v A rzower mandates
a finding that the FDPA is unconstitutional.'
II. Hdding
Both courts granted the defendants' motions to strike all death penalty
aspects from each case on the ground that the FDPA is unconstitutional. The
court in Qudm based its finding on statistical evidence that a significantlylarger
number of innocent people than was previously supposed were being executed
across the country and because convincing proof of their innocence does not
emerge in manycases until long after their convictions The court in Fef!found
that the FDPA isunconstitutional because the FDPA bases a finding of eligibility
1.
2.
Fell, 217
3.
4.

Federal Death Penaky Act, 18 US.C SS 3591-3598 (2000).
United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256,257 (S.DN.Y. 2002); United States v.
F. Supp. 2d 469,473 (D. Vt. 2002).
Qdnzrs, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257; Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416,420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

5. 122 S. QL 2428 (2002).
6. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at473-74;sRing v. Arizona, 122S. Q. 2428,2443 (2002) (holding
that capital sentencing procedure in Arizona violated Sixth Amendment jurytrial guarantees because
trial judge determined whether aggravating factors existed to justify imposition of death penat).
7. Qrir , 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
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for imposition of the death penalty on information that is not subject to Sixth
Amendment guarantees of confrontation and cross-examination, nor to rules of
evidentiary admissibility guaranteed by the Due Process Clause to fact-finding
involving offense elements!
II.A mbsis

A. Quinones
The Government raised three objections to the court's tentative decision to
dismiss the death penalty aspects of the case: (1) the issue was not ripe for
adjudication because Quinones had not yet been convicted; (2)the Framers of
the Constitution, the United States Congress, and the United States Supreme
Court all accepted the constitutionalityof capital punishment despite the inherent
fallibilityof the judicial system, and thus the FDPA was not flawed and innocent
people who were mistakenlyexecuted were not deprived of due process; and (3)
the evidence on which the court relied was either unreliable, irrelevant, or both
1. R;O-ws
The Government conceded that Quinones had standing to challenge the
FDPA because it filed the statutory"death notice" seeking imposition of the
death sentence." However, the Government argued that the court was deciding
the issue before it was absolutelynecessaryand that such a decision would be the
equivalent of an advisoryopinion that it had a dutyto refrain from issuing." The
court agreed that it had a duty to refrain from issuing advisory opinions and to
exercise judicial restraint, but disagreed with the Government's contention that
it was deciding the issue too quickly. 2 The court found that it must reach the
issue now because "the pendency of the death penalty has immediate practical
and legal consequences in this case that cannot be postponed." 3 First, the court
stated that because prospective jurors strongly opposed to capital punishment
must be excused for cause in a capital case, a trial, if the court did not address the
issue immediately, would exclude a significant class of potential jurors who would
be fit to serve if the death penalty were absent from the case. 4 The content of
pre-trial questionnaires and voir dire questions would also be different depending
on whether or not the death penalty is involved."s In addition, each party's
8.
9.
10.

Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
Qdun , 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257-64.
Id at 257.

11.

Id

12.
13.
14.

Id

Id at 257-58.
Id at 258; sw Lockhart v. Mctee, 476 US. 162,170 n7 (1986) (stating that goverment
my challenge for cause prospective jurors whose opposition to death penalty may prevent them
m impartially determining capital defendant's guilt or innocence).
.15. Qidra, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
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number and ratio of peremptory challenges differ depending on whether or not
the death penalty is involved.16 Finally, the court found that Quinones was
making a facial challenge so that the substantive arguments for and against the
challenge would be the same at all stages of the proceeding. 17 The court therefore found that the issue was ripe for adjudication and that its consideration
could not be postponed without material prejudice to Quinones."s
2. Duh Pmazs
The Government argued that the Framers of the Constitution ("the Framers"), the United States Congress ("Congress"), and the United States Supreme
Court ("the Supreme Court") all accepted the constitutionality of administering
capital punishment despite the "inherent fallibility of the judicial system.
Based on this view, the Government contended that even the likelihood that
innocent people might have been mistakenlyexecuted did not mean that theydid
not receive due process or that the statute was flawed.20 The court responded to
and rejected each of the Government's points2
The Government first argued that the Framers "assumed the existence of
capital punishment, doubtless against a backdrop in which they did not expect
flawless administration of the penalty," based on the language of the Fifth
Amendment. 2 The court first stated that an assumption of the existence of the
death penaltywas not the same as an endorsement of it, and that to expect some
flaws in administration was not the same as to permit the execution of numerous
innocent people.? The court also found that the Framers "were simply applying
due process to the full panoply of anticipated actions, rather than endorsing or
even commenting on any particular kind of deprivation."2 ' Finally, the court
found that the Fifth Amend
t guarantee of due process required an interpretation in light of evolving standards of fairness and ordered libertysimilar to the
interpretation accorded to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. 5
16. Id; se FED. R.QUM P. 24(b) (stating that Government and defense receive at least
twenty peremptory challenges in death penalty cases, while Government only receives six and
defense receives ten peremptory challenges in non-death penalty cases).
17.
Quini, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
18.
Id at 259.

19.
20.

Id
Id

21.
Idat 259-64.
22. Id at 259; se US. COICST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be deprived of/I
liberty or property without due process of law (emphasis added)).
23.
Quiws,205 F. Supp. 2d at 259.

24.

Id

25. Id at 259-60; see U.S.COST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment);
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. O. 2242, 2246-47 (2002) (holding that Eighth Amendment must be
interpreted in light of evolving standards of decency).
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Next, the Government argued that Congress understood and debated
whether to enact the FDPA despite the risk that innocent individuals might be
sentenced to death, and that Congress still chose to enact the FDPA.26 The court
rejected this claim because the Government either cited to only "a few spare
comments on the floor of Congress," some of which were made six years prior
to the enactment of the FDPA and in reference to a different statute, or placed
certain comments from Congressmen out of context." The court found a
complete absence of debate within the formal history of the FDPA and also
determined that the clearest and most compelling evidence of the innocence of
those sentenced to death was DNA evidence that emerged after the enactment
of the FDPA in 1994.28 The court also found that Congress could not necessarilyoverride a protected liberty"absent a far more clear and compelling need than
any presented here."29
Finally, the Government argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Herrera v CdP ° was fatal to Quinones's motion and that the decision foreclosed the court's preliminary ruling.' First, the court examined Hem'ra and
found that the holding of the Court was that a trulypersuasive demonstration of
"actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of such defendant
unconstitutional, but that the petitioner must meet a high threshold showing of
innocence to overcome the state's need for finality. 2 The court also found that
Herradid not address the issue presented before the court, and that Hernm's
sole holding only applied to applications for habeas relief and not to pre-trial
statutory challenges in which the defendant is presumed to be innocent.33 The
court further determined that the onlyconclusion commanding a majorityof the
Justices was that the execution of the innocent was forbidden by the Constitution.' Finally, the court found that, although the Court discussed the implica26.

Qkdru,

205 F. Supp. 2d at 260.

27. Id The court, in a footnote, criticized the Government for some of its ciations,
particularlyan instance inwhichthe Government quoted an"unnamed Senator" as supporni its
position when, in fact, the court was able to attribute the quote to Senator Arlin Specter and mc
that he was discussing the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act, that it was made six years before Congress
passed the FDPA, and that Senator Specter prefaced the Government's quote with statements that
actually supported the court's finding of Congress' prevailing view that sentencing an innocent
person to death was an extremely unlikelyevent. Id at 260 n.2.
28. Id at 260-61.
29. Id at 261.
30. 506 US. 390 (1993).
31.
QiNaa, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 261;swHerrera v. Collins, 506 US. 390,417 (1993) (finding
that petitioner did not make persuasive showing of innocence necessary to consider claim after
expiration of time provided by state law for presentation of newly discovered evidence).
32.
Qawam, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (citing Hewra, 506 U.S. at 417).
33.
Qdrnas, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 262-63. BieseeUnited States v. Church, 217 F. Supp. 2d 700,
702 (W.D. Va. 2002) (finding that Hnm "forecloses the argument that the inherent fallibility of
the criminal justice system supports a due process attack on the death penalty").
34. Quima, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 263. The court relied on the concurring opinions of Justices
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tions of the inherent fallibility of anysystem of justice on the death penalty such
discussions did not involve the "ground-breaking DNA testing and other
exonerative evidence developed in the years since."" Therefore, the court
rejected the Government's objections to its preliminary ruling. 6
3. IxorawEidver

The Government argued that the evidence relied upon by the court was
either unreliable, irrelevant, or both.37 The Government first contended that the
presence of DNA testing will actually reduce the risk of mistaken convictions."
The court rejected the Government's argument on several grounds." First, the
court stated that DNA testing has proven the existence of a "remarkable degree
of fallibility in the basic fact-finding processes on which we rely in criminal
cases." ° The court also noted that DNA testing could onlybe used in a minority
of cases that involve recoverable and relevant DNA samples and that the DNA
evidence relied upon bythe court merelyserved as an example that other scientific techniques could emerge in the future that also would expose mistaken
verdicts.41 The court further noted that exoneration often was, and still could be
in the future, a result of less scientific developments such as witness recantations
or newly discovered evidence 2 The court found that recent developments
brought about by DNA testing showed the unreliability of the primary techO'Connor and Kennedy and the dissenting opinions of Justices Blaclmun, Stevens and Souter,
390 US.
r
which all stated that execution of the innocent would be unconstitutional. Id; seeH n,
at 419, 430.
35. Qain , 205 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
36. Id
37. Id at 264.
38. Id
39.

Id at 264-65.

40. Id at 264. The court referred to twelve cases in which death row inmates were exonerated by DNA evidence after each inmate had been found guilty by a unanimous jury and had
collateralchallenges rejected bynumerous courts that carefuflyscrutinized the evidence and manner
of conviction. Id The court stated:
[Despite] all this alleged "due process," the result, in each and everyone of these cases
was me conviction of an innocent person who, because of the death penalty, woul

shortly have been executed (-some came within days of being so-) were it not for the
fortuiious development of a new scientific technice that happeied to be applicable
to their particulai cases.
Id
41. Qrira, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
42. Id The court cited a government studywhich showed that intweny'eight cases of postconviction exoneration based on DNA testing, defendants spent an average of seven years in prison
before the actual innocence was uncovered. Id at 264 n.9 (citing NANAAINs1mu OFJLmCa,
OFFICE oFJus'lnCE PROGRAmS, U.S. DEPARTMENTOFJunCZ, CONWICMDBYJURIES, EXONERATED BY SCENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABUSH INNOCENCE
AFTER TIAL iii (1996)).
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niques developed and used bythe judicial system and emphasized that execution
arbitrarilyeliminates anypossibilityof exoneration after a certain period of time."
The court held that current trial methods could only result in "the fully foreseeable execution of numerous innocent persons.""
The Government also asserted that both the DNA and non-DNA exonerations were irrelevant to the constitutionalityof the FDPA because the exonerated
defendants were all state convicts." The Government further argued that no
federal convicts were found in the study because the FDPA and federal procedure provide greater protection to defendants." The court rejected these arguments because the sample was too small and the convictions were too recent to
draw such conclusions. 7 The court noted that the seven-to-ten year time period
ithad found with state convicts who were later exonerated had not yet passed for
those sentenced to death under the FDPA. 8 The court was particularlytroubled
by the case of David Ronald Chandler, who the Government conceded had a
"colorable claim of actual innocence," and who eventually had his sentence
commuted by President Clinton.49
43. Qdsnws,205 F. Supp. 2d at 264-65.
44. Id at 265. The court stated that the DNA evidence was sufficient to establish its finding,
but that other evidence existed in which even more death row inmates had been exonerated by
investigations that used more conventional methods. Id (citing Q u, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 418).
The court examined evidence from the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC') and, even
though it admitted that the DPICmaypossiblyhave been over-inclusive, the court "conservatively
concluded that at least twenty such defendants released from death row over the past decade for
reasons unrelated to DNA testing were factually innocent." Id (citing Qiim, 196 F. Supp. 2d
at 418). The court also found that these twentydefendants ended up serving more time in prison,
an average of ten )ears, because their investigations did not rely on DNA evidence. Id
45. Id at 266.
46. Id
47. Id The court noted, however, that five of the thirtyone persons sentenced under the
FDPA have alreadyhad their sentences reversed. Id BitseCbnkh,217 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (finding
that evidence of state exonerations was irrelevant because none of thirtyone persons convicted
under FDPA had sentences reversed, five had sentences set aside for reasons unrelated to guilt or
innocence, onlyone defendant had death sentence commuted to life imprisonment, and only two
federal capital defendants had actually been executed).
48. Qknmm, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
49. Idat266n.13. Clandler was found guiltyof arranging the murder of a police informant.
Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clbxmw Last-Day (IC BryfBa 176; List IndWis Pantbifir
Cism, McDar Dam, adRogr Ga,WASI. POST,Jan. 21, 2001, at Al. He was the first
person sentenced to die under the federal drug kingpin statute. Peter SlevinAns tdx W4iteHwse
Qw&DoortoC/nvmm WASK-POST, Feb. 8,2001, at A14;see21 US.C S848(e)(1)(A) (allowing for
sentence of death in conviction of any person who intentionally kills or commands killing of
individual in furtherance of continuing criminal enterprise). Chandler would have been the first
person executed under federal law since 1963. Goldstein & Schmidt, ssq~a, at Al. The Govern-

ment's primarywimess, however, recanted his testimonyand admitted that he himself committed
the murder. Id The witness also stated that Chandler knew nothing of the murder. Slevin, sa,
at A14. Attorney General Janet Reno recommended the commutation to President Clinton just
before his presidential termended, and President Clinton commuted the death sentence. Goklstein
&Schmidt, sura,at Al. Chandler is now serving a life sentence, without parole, for the crime. Id
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The court also compared state practices and procedures to those of the
FDPA. First, the court found that all of the primaryprotections, such as proof
beyond areasonable doubt and trial by jury, were the same in both systems. 0
The court also determined that certain federal practices could actually "present
a gnmr risk of wrongful capital convictions than parallel state practices.""1 As
an example, the court stated that federal practice allows the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice to suffice for conviction, while states such as Alabama, California, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas require corroboration. 2 The court further found that the most common cause of mistaken
convictions was inaccurate eyewitness testimony, to which the federal rules are
as receptive as the state rules." As a result, the court found that the federal
system would not be any more successful at avoiding mistaken capital convictions than the state systems.'
The court relied on a study conducted byProfessorJames S.Liebman and
his colleagues in which they found a sixty-eight percent rate of legal error in both
state and federal appeals fromthe death penalty ss The Government attacked the
study by alleging that Professor Liebnan was "an avowed opponent of the death
penalty"-6 The court rejected this argument as well, stating that Professor
The court noted that serious doubts about Chandler's guilt may have prompted the sentence
commutation, but that Chandler was not granted a full pardon and that the use of executive
clemencyhas significantlydiinished inrecent years. ui
, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 266 n.13. In the
court's opinion, clemencyalso 'cannot address the problem of the mistakenlyconvicted defendant
who is executed before he can prove his innocence." Id
50. Qdrur, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
51. Id at 267 (emphasis added).
52. Id;swUhited States v.Baker, 985 F.2d 1248,1255 (4thCr. 1993) (findingthatconviction
maybe sustained based on testimonyof single accomplice); seeasoALA. CODE § 12-21-222 (1975)
(prohibiting conviction based solely on uncorroborated testimony of accomplice); CAL PENAL
CODE S 1111 (West 1985) (prohibiting same); NEV. REV. STAT. 175291 (2001) (prohibiting same);
N.Y. OQvt PROC LAW S 60.22 (McKinney 1992) (prohibiting same); OR. REV. STAT. 5 136.440
(1999) (prohibiting same); S.D.ODIFIEDLAWS S23A-22-8 (Michie 1998) (prohibiting same); Ttx.
all. PROC CODE ANN. S 38.14 (Vernon 1979) (prohibiting same). The court also found that
federal practice has a lower standard for allowing circumstantial evidence to sustain a capital
conviction than some states. QdMW, 205 F.Supp. 2d at 267. C
United States v. Russell, 971
F.2d 1098,1109 (4th CAr. 1992) (finding that courtwas notre
to imtruct jurythat circumstantial evidence must be so strong as to exclude every reasonable hyothesis other than guilt); ikh
Gregory v. State, 15 S.W.3d 690, 694 (Ark 2000) (stating that in conviction based solely on
circumstantial evidence, evidence must show guilt to moral certainty and must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than guil (quoting Johnson v. State, 197 S.W.2d 936 (Ark 1946))).
53. Quirs, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
54. Id at 267-68.
55. Id at 268; seeJAMES S. LIEBMAN, ETAL, ABROKENSYSTEM: ERRORRATES INCAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995 i (2000) (studying rate of legal error in appeals from capital convictions). SW
pnzfy JAMES S.LIEBMAN, ETAL, ABROKENSYSTEM PARTII: WYTI-RE IS SOMUC-ERROR
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND MiATCANBE DONE ABOUrIT (2002) (studying reasons for legal errors

and potential solutions).
56. Qkinw, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268.

CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

Liebman's study was "by far the most careful and comprehensive study in this
one based, moreover, exclusively on public records and court deciarea, and
" s7
sions.
B. Fell
Fell filed a motion and a supplemental motion in which he asserted that the
FDPA is unconstitutional5 8 In his supplemental motion, Fell asserted that the
United States Supreme Court's recent holding inRizgmandates a finding that the
FDPA isunconstitutionaL 9 The court examined the FDPA in light of not only
andAppvmi v NewJese' and found that the
Rir* but also cm v UniState
FDPA is unconstitutional.'
t qcFederalDeathPealtyLegskaion
1. Histofuid (n
The court examined the history of federal death penalty legislation to
establish a context for its analysis.63 The court first recognized that the death
penalty, and the need for more rigorous procedure when considering the imposition of a death sentence were as old as the country itself." The court then
examined the tortured history of mandatory death sentencing, which the Su57. Id
58. Fd4 217 F. Supp. 2d at 473-74. Fell's original motion soughtadeclaration that the FDPA
is unconstitutional because:
innoce n (2) the
(fit fails to avoid sentences of death for the factually and
of the Fih and
PA's sentencig scheme is incomprehensible to a jury, in via
Sixth Anendments (3) the FDPA Tails to narrow adectuately the class of persons
Aemnt; (4) the relaxd
eligible for thedadipenaty in violation of the EighthK
evidentiary stand a applicable to the penalty phase of trial renders any findings
t~~n fails to chaige a capital crime; (6) a jio consider(5)t
cottonl
I-posaa caprwtous
the arb
a
anits
odnon-statutofactors
a
ia
n o the Eigfth and Fourteent Andment;
tion of a sentence
,lie FDPA's delegation to the government o the power to define aggravatin
rors violates se.pamtion of powers principles and the non-dection dotrine im
violation of Article I, S 1; (8) iis delegation to the government of me power to detmne
non-statutory aravati factors after the crime But before trial violates the ex post
facto clause; (9)-h FDP-A is internally inconsistent, precluding the use of non-statuvatng factors; (10) the use of non-statutory a r-vao fars without
tory
isunder
providig for proportionaltyreviewis uncons .ti .nal "(1l)-the .a
alcircumastances cruel and unusualpunishment in vioaton of the Eight Amendment;
(12) the death penalty violates binding international law.
kid The court did not address these issues in its opinion.
59. Id at 474.
60. 526 US. 227 (1999).
61. 530 US. 466 (2000).
62. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 474; seJones v. Lnkited States, 526 US. 227,252 (1999) (finding
that federal carjacking statute's provisions for sentencing defined elements for three distinct
offenses); Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 US. 466,494(2000) (finding that NewJersey's proscribed
"sentencing factor" increased sentence beyond maximum sentence and acted as functional
equivalent of element of greater offense).
63. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 474-77.
64. Id.at 474.
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preme Court struck down entirely." The court determined that a constitutional
capital punishment scheme must meet two requirements: (1) guidance to limit
the discretion of the sentencing body, and (2) an opportunity for the sentencing
bodyto take into consideration the individual circumstances of the offender and
the offense.6 The court further emphasized the need for heightened reliability
in capital punishment cases and that both the trial and sentencing processes must

satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Cause.67 The court acknowledged

that the Supreme Court had not yet "con cl uded that 'the entire panoply of

criminal trial procedural rights' are required in a capital sentencing."' The court
also noted, however, that an ongoing obligation still existed to "'re-examine
capital sentencing procedures
against evolving standards of procedural fairness
69
in a civilized society."
2. FDPA
The court then examined the FDPA itself and stated that the FDPA requires a juryin a capital case to make three distinct determinations at a separate
sentencing hearing." First, the juryis required to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant acted with one of four mental culpability factors.71 If the jury
finds a mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, it then determines whether the
Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory
aggravating factor exists.' If the Government met its burden in these two tests,
then the jury is required to find whether all of the aggravating factors, both
statutory and nonstatutory, so outweigh all the mitigating factors as to justify a
65. Id at 475-76; see Williams v. Georgia, 349 US. 375, 391 (1955) (distinguishing between
capital and non-capital offenses); Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam)
(finding imposition of death penalty in specified cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment
inviolation of Eighth Amendment); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US. 280,304 (1976) (striking
down mandatory death sentences entirely because consideration of character and record of
individual offender, and circumstances of particular offense, were constitutionallyindispensable part
of capital punishment scheme). The distinction found in Wi= between capital and non-capital
offenses created an inference of heightened reliability when mandatory death sentences were
involved. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 475; sealso Wodar, 428 US. at 305 (striking down mandatory
death sentences because of "the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from
a sentence of imprisonment, however long").
66. Fdl 217 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
67. Id
68. Id at 477 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 US. 349, 358 n.9 (1977)).
69. Id (quoting Ganbw', 430 US. at 357).
70. id
71. Id; see18 US.C § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2000) (requiring jury to find mental culpability
factor beyond a reasonable doubt).
72. Fd4 217 F. Supp. 2d at 477; see18 US.C S 3592(c)(1)-(16) (2000) (requiring finding
beyond a reasonable doubt of one of listed aggravating factors); 18 US.C S 3593(c)-(d) (2000)
(requiring juryto find whether Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt existence of at least
one statutory aggravating factor).
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sentence of death.73 The FDPA also provides, however, that information
relevant to the sentence, which includes any mitigating or aggravating factor, is
admissible rnr ss of its admissibility under the rules of evidence for criminal
trials and that the information may be excluded only if the probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or that it
maymislead the jury. 4 The Government and the defendant have an opportunity
to rebut anyinformation and to argue about the adequacyof the information and
the appropriateness of imposing a sentence of death.

3. Elekm Versm Sentmm

Factor

a. Ring, Jones, and Apprendi
The court examined several Supreme Court cases to distinguish a fact as an
element of the crime from6 a fact as a sentencing factor, but prinarilyfocused on
Jones, Appmr and RiVg7
i Jones
In Joe, the Supreme Court examined the federal carjacking statute to
determine if it defined separate offenses or separate maximum penalties.' In
1988, the statute set out, in three different subsections, a fifteen-year maximum
penalty, a twenty-five-year maximum penaltyif serious bodilyinjuryresulted, and
a maximum penalty of life imprisonment if death resulied .7' The Court interpreted the statute as setting forth elements of three distinct offenses and emphasized the rule that any fact, other than prior conviction, "that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'
73.

Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 477; se 18 US.C S 3593(e) (2000) (requiring jury to weigh

aggravating factors against mitigating factors). The Government has the burden of proving the
existence of an aggravating factor beyond areasonable doubt. S3593(c). The jury's finding must
be unanimous. S 3593(d). The defendant's burden of proving the existence of any mitigating
factors is a preponderance of evidence, and a mitigating factor may be found by one or more
members of the jury. S3593(c). The death sentence must be a unanimous decision by the jury.
S 3593(e).
74. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 477-78; se S3593(c).
75. F4 217 F. Supp. 2d at 478; seeS 3593(c).
76. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 478-83. The court also examined the holdings of WWI= v.
Pensylvania, 477 US. 79, 88 (1986) (finding Pennsylvania statute that subjected defendant to
minimum sentence of five-years imprisonment if convicted to be constitutionally permissible
sentencing factor), and Alnendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US. 224, 235, 247 (1998) (finding
that Congress intended recidivism to be sentencing factor and that recidivism did not need to be
treated as element of offense). Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 479-80.
77. Fdi 217 F.Supp.2dat 480;Jfr, 526 US. at 229; see
18 US.C 52119 (2000) (describing

elements and sentencing provisions for federal cariaclng crime).
78. Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at480;Jm, 526 US. at 230; 52119.
79.

Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (quotingJor, 526 US. at 243 n.6). The Court adopted the

doctrine of constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute as setting forth elements of distinct

2002]

QUINONES & FELL

ii Apprendi
In AppnmiA the Supreme Court examined a NewJerseystatute that allowed
a trial judge to impose a lengthier term of imprisonment if the judge found, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant committed a crime with a
statutorily-defined "biased purpose." 0 The Court found that such a scheme
actually served to make the sentencing factor "the functional equivalent of an
element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict.""
The state legislature could not constitutionallyremove from the jurya determination of a fact that, if found, allowed the court to impose a penalty that exceeded
the maximum that he would receive if the defendant was punished according to
onlythe facts reflected in the jury's guilty verdict. a2
iii Ring
In Ru* the Supreme Court held that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme
was unconstitutional because it violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial on all elements of the offense. 3 The Supreme Court applied its
holdings from Jones and Appmli and determined that Arizona's aggravating
factors actually operated as the functional equivalent of an element of the greater
offense of capital murder because the Arizona court, by state law, could not
sentence the defendant to the maximum penalty of death unless the sentencing
judge made further factual determinations about the presence or absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 4 The Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires a juryto find the requisite aggravating factors."5
offenses. Id BusoeMdVilhx, 477 US. at 87-88 (finding that Pennsylvania statute established visible
possession of firearm as sentencing factor and not element of crime because state legislature
specificallydefined such possession as sentenn factor, statute did not alter maximumpenahyfor
crime committed, and did not create separate offense with separate penalt);Abnmnvz. Tam, 523
U.S. at 247 (1998) (finding that statute that created enhanced sentence if initaldeportation followed
conviction for commission of aggravated felony only established sentencing factor because

Congress intended to define as sentencing factor and that sentencing factor at issue did not need
to be treated as element of offense).
80. Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 481; Appmi 530 US. at 468-69.
81. Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (quoting Appnni, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
82. Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (quoting Appverh 530 U.S. at 482-83).
83. Id at 478;Rig 122 S. C. at 2443. For a complete discussion and analysis of RirSsealso
Janice L Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 143 (2002) (analyzing Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. C. 2428
(2002)).
afsyRig 122S.CL
84. Fdl,217F.Supp.2d at481 (quotingRbg 122 S. CL at2443). See
at 2438-40; Appnn 530 US. at 476;J r, 526 US. at 243 n.6 (determining whether sentencing
schemes constituted elements of greater offenses). But see Harrisv. United States, 122 S. C. 2406,
penaky
2410 (2002) (reaffirming Md"iUmbecause factual finding that increases mandatorynin
and not maximum penalty does not create element of separate offense).

85.

Fdl,217 F. Supp. 2d at 481; Rirg 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
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4. Appliadn q"Ring, Jones, and Apprendi to FDPA
The court in Fdl first stated that Rir on its face, does not necessarily
invalidate the FDPA because the FDPA requires the jury to make the findings
on the "death eligibility" factors. 6 This provision satisfies the Sixth Amend-

ment's jury trial guarantee."' The court, however, found that the RiJcwAppwrii line of cases establishes that the FDPA's "death eligibility" factors must
be treated as elements of the greater crime, regardless of the label, because the
statutoryaggravating factors and mental culpabilityfactors expose defendants to
a punishment greater than the punishment otherwise legally prescribed. 8 The
court found this determination important because it created potential conflicts
with the Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
i Inadnt (JaAe
The court found that "the clear implication of the [Rig] decision, resting as
squarely as it does inJoe, is that in a federal capital case the Fifth Amendment
right to agrand jury indictment will apply." 9 The Government, however, filed

asuperseding indictment that included the mental culpability factors and statutory aggravating factors it intended to prove at trial." Fell argued that the FDPA
violated the Fifth Amendment right to grand juryindictment because it specified
the form of notice the Government must provide, but it did not provide for
inclusion in the indictment of aggravating factors.9 1 The court rejected this
argument.92 The absence of language about the grand jury's role in charging
death-eligibility factors did not suggest that Congress intended to "forbid grand
jury participation or to exclude" the factors from an indictment.93 In addition,
even though the FDPA prescribes that a defendant receive notice of the deatheligibilityfactors, such language does not preclude a grand juryfrom deliberating
on and voting to indict on those factors." The court found that the FDPAs
language, on its face, does not violate the Indictment Clause and that the Government's superseding indictment provided proper notice to Fell of every element
of the capital offenses with which he was charged."
86.

Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 482.

87.

Id
Id at 483; se 18 US.C S 3593(d) (2000) (stating that if jury finds no aggravating factor

88.
set forth
89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

in 5 3592, court must impose sentence other than death).
F4 217 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
Id at 483-84.
Id at 484.

Id
Id
Id
FdA, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 484.

QUINONES & FELL

2002]

ii Due Promss ard Cafieaw Cawss
The court found that the Ri-Jcn-Appwrzi line of cases created a conflict,
however, between the FDPA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.?' The FDPA
permits juries to consider any information relevant to the sentence, and such
evidence is subject to exclusion only if it creates a danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, in which the danger would

outweigh its probative value.9 ' The court found that because capital cases require
heightened reliability and procedural safeguards, a relaxed evidentiary standard
for death-eligibility factors would not satisfy the demands of due process and

rights of confrontation if such factors are considered the functional equivalents
of elements of the greater offense.9"
The court also found that the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses "have long been recognized as essential to due process."9 Even though

the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment applied to sentencing proceedings, the court read the Sixth
Amendment's reference to "all criminal prosecutions" as meaning that Sixth

Amendment rights are not confined to only the guilt phase of trial.'00 In the
court's view, the important issue was a functional question of what rights are
required at a proceeding in which facts are found that equate to offense
elements. 10' The court looked to the Supreme Court's analysis of a Missouri
capital sentencing statute in Bu&t"nv Missoi,102 in which the Court found that

Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding resembled a trial on the issue of guilt or
innocence and that due process protection applied to such a sentencing proceeding.103 The court found the FDPA to be "indistinguishable from Missouri's
96.
97.

Id at 485.
Id; se 18 US.C S 3593(c) (2000) (relaxing evidentiay standards in sentencing proceed-

98. F4Z 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485. The court stated that this concern would have been
particularly relevant in Fell's case because the Government intended to introduce evidence at the
sentencing hearing that would not have met any exception to the hearsay rule in the Federal Rules
of Evidence and that this evidence would not be admissible in the guilt phase of a criminal trial

Id

99.
100.

Id at 485-86 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US. 284,294 (1973)).
US. DoT. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
Id at 486; swe

enjoy the right

...
to be

confronted with the witnesses against him"). The court also compared

the rights to confrontation with the rihts to notice and counsel, which are required at all critical
stages of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. Fd, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 486; see Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 US. 128, 134 (1967) (holding that Sixth Amendment rights to notice and counsel are
required at all critical stages of criminal proceeding).
101. F4 217 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
102. 451 US. 430 (1981).
103. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 487; sw Bullington v. Mdissouri, 451 US. 430, 444-46 (1981)
(holding that double jeopardy, via Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, applies because
sentencing hearing prescribed by hissouri statute resembled guilt phase of trial.
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statute in any meaningful way," and that the FDPA is required to provide the
same level of due process protections." °
The court stated that "in realitythe FDPA has separated the determination
of guilt of a capital offense into two adversarial fact-finding proceedings, one to
determine guilt of the underlying offense, followed by one to determine guilt of
the capital offense."' The court also emphasized that the second proceeding
required the highest degree of reliabilityin the fact-finding process because of the
"unique and momentous interest at stake.""° The court stated that although
Congress has the power to prescribe the evidence a federal court can receive, the
Due Process Clause limits that Congressional power.07 Congress relaxed the
evidentiary standards in the sentencing proceeding under the FDPA, and the
court stated that it could not save, byjudicial reconstruction, the unconstitutional
relaxed evidentiary standards without explicitly defying Congress's mandate.08
Because the FDPA violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
and the rules of evidentiary admissibility guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the court ruled that the FDPA is unconstitutional."°
IV.Appim in Vngzma
QNzvo and Fel are not binding authorityto Virginia capital cases in either
federal or state court. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia has already rejected a challenge to the FDPA that was based on the
holding of Qib." 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Qrcuit has yet to rule on the matter. The QNsm analysis would presumably be
appropriate for raising state death penalty concerns; however, it seems unlikely
that Virginia courts would accept that analysis without a United States Supreme
Court mandate, and, even if one existed, without substantial proof of unjust
execution in Virginia specifically.
Felts holding and analysis, meanwhile, have not been applied in Virginia by
either the state or federal courts as of this writing. The holding and analysis,
however, applyequallyas well to Virginia's capital sentencing procedures as they
do to the FDPA. Section 19.2-2642 of the Virginia Code states:
[A] sentence of datbsll not be m'psaidids th oorjuys/* l. . .fiW
that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he
stands charged was outrageouslyorwantolyvile, horrible orinhuman
104.

Fe!,217 F. Supp. 2d at 487.

105.

Id

106.
107.
108.

Id at 487-88.

109.

Id

110.

SeeChah, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (disagreeing with holding in Qkium).

Id at 488-89.
Idat 489.

2002]

QUINONES & FELL

in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim..
If the jury does not find one of the aggravating factors listed in Section 19.22642, then it cannot recommend a sentence of death; thus "the defendant shall
be sentenced to imprisonment for life." 112 The RiJrt-AJPV&line of cases
establishes that the aggravating factors increase the maximum punishment a
defendant may face. In particular, the aggravating factor of vileness is directly
analogous to the second aggravating factor found by the trial court in Rir"'
1
Rig therefore, applies direcdy to capital sentencing procedure in Virginia. i
The FeYnaysis then provides that the aggravating factors cannot be subject
to relaxed evidentiary standards because they operate as elements of the greater
crime."1 ' The court in Fd found that the FDPA's relaxed evidentiary standards
in the sentencing proceedi s did not provide "the highest degree of reliability"
necessary in a capital case. 6 Similarly, Section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia
Code relaxes the evidentiary standards for the aggravating factors because it
subjects those factors to only a relevancy standard.117 The General Assembly
compounded its error by apparently subjecting mitigation evidence to the rules
of evidence. Therefore, Section 19.2-264.4(B) assigns a higher admissibility
standard for mitigation evidence than it does for evidence of aggravating
factors.' This difference in evidentiarystandards is not constitutionallypermissible.1 9 Virginia's capital sentencing procedures raise Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment concerns similar to those raised in Fd.

111. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-2642 (Mchie 2000) (emphasis added).
Ide; VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Mfichie 2000).
Cap
192-264.2 (listing "conduct in commitng the offense for which [the defen113.
,
dan] stands charged [that] was outrageously or wantonlyv, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim" as aggravating factor);
uizbRi 122 S.C at 2435 (stating that trial court found second aggravating factor to be "that the
offense was committed 'in an especiallyheinous, cruel or depraved manner").
114. For an in depth discussion of Ri's application to capital sentencing procedure in
Virginia, see Kopec, s"qpu note 83, at 152-55.
115. Fd 217 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
116. 1Id
117. See VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B) (stating that "evidence maybe presented as to any
matter which the court deems relevant to sentence" in capital sentence proceeding (emphasis
added)).
118. Se id (stating that "[elvidence which maybe admissible, subject to the rules of evidence
governing admissibility, may include ... facts in mitigation of the offense"); sealo Wxod,cn, 428
US. at 305 (stating that need for reliabilityis greater indetermination of whether sentence of death
is appropriate).
119. SeeMlls v. Maryland, 486 US. 367,384 (1988) (holding that jurycannot be led to believe
that it must unanimously find mitigating facts). The combined holdings of Mils and Rigindicate
that aggravating factors, because they act as elements, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
by a jury, while mitigation evidence is subject to a more relaxed standard.
112.
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V. CQndmion
Qdirwx effectively serves as an attack on the death penaltyitself, while Fd!
effectively serves as an attack on capital procedures. The Qmivo decision
provides a good analytical framework from which to work if substantial evidence
of unjust execution is presented, particularly if such evidence shows a high rate
of unjust executions in Virginia. The Fdl decision creates a verystrong analytical
framework, based on Rir to declare the FDPA and Section 19.2-264.4(B) of the
Virginia Code unconstitutional. Both decisions will, in all likelihood, receive a
great amount of attention from not only the federal Courts of Appeals and
120the
Supreme Court, but also from state and federal courts across the country.
Philip H Yoon

120.
Capital defense attorneys are urged to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse
for a motion to declare S 19.2-264.4(B) unconstitutional as it applies to aggravating elements based
on Rig.

